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Introduction 
Ottoman Army organization had started to deteriorate from the mid-17th century. 
Military failures made the social and economic problems worse. In this situation, 
alternative potentials in the empire appeared because of the increasing military 
needs of the central government and the provincial governors. By the way, general 
employment of the Albanian warriors who were famous with their courage and 
strength became possible.1 
There were a lot of reasons for employing Albanian warriors with salary while there 
was Ottoman regular army corps, including janissaries and soldiers from the states. 
Governing problems, had existed in the states and land system after the defeat in 
Vienne at 1683, was one of these reasons. Also after the end of the conquering era, 
the castles and fortresses at the borderlines were built for defense and there were not 
a necessary number of soldiers in these buildings. This problem was tried to by 
employing the warriors with long- matchlock-guns from Bosnia, Herzegovina and 
Albania.2 During the time, the necessity of mercenary increased too much as seen in 
the example of the Ottoman army which established for pressing the Greek Revolt 
in 1821, was almost composed of the Albanian soldiers.3  
There were historical reasons for choosing Albanian soldiers in the Balkans. A 
strong feudal-system had existed in the Albanian lands before the Ottoman rule. 
This social structure, which consisted of the local connections and obedience 
around the lords, continued by integrating, first, timar (fief) system after the 
Ottoman conquest in 1385 and then, devshirme system. The flexibility of the 
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Ottoman rule made it easy for the Albanian tribes, who were known as stubbornness 
and rebellious, to integrate the Ottoman system.1 
During the decline period of the Ottoman Empire, the Albanian dynasties of the 
past, who were fief-holders appeared as the owners of the great malikâne (lease) 
and farms (çiftlik). So, governing bodies, called pashalik in the sancaks (provinces) 
of the Albanian region and had military potentials were established during the 18th 
century. These pashaliks which had weak relations with the center, like the âyâns in 
Anatolia and Rumelia, gathered, in time, around the Pashalik of Scutari 
(Shkëder/İşkodra) at the north and the Pashalik of Yanya (Ioannina) at the south. 
Mehmed Pasha from Bushati (Buşatlı) family at the north and the dynasty of Ali 
Pasha of Tepelena at the south established the control.2 Afterwards, the empire 
started to apply to the pashaliks when it had need mercenaries.3 
The Ottoman Empire had increasing interior and exterior problems with the turn of 
the 19th century. These problems deeply felt in the Balkans because of its mixed 
ethnic structure and being near to the Europe. So, the need for the Albanian soldiers 
for solving the crisis, increased. While the Nizam-ı Cedit (New Order) reforms 
started for solving the structural problems of the state by Sultan Selim III (1789-
1807), had failed, the authority of the state almost disappeared in the center and 
periphery. New power centers which were rival to the state authority, had 
established. Janissaries, which were the significant military power of the Ottoman 
Empire, were gone out of control and started to be a part of political rivalries in 
Istanbul together with some Albanian groups.4 
From the beginning of the 19th century, the influence of the Albanian mercenaries 
increased at the political rivalries in the center and also in the states. Apart from 
these chronic problems inside, the effects of the French Revolution started to be 
seen on the borders of the Ottoman Empire. The first effects of the revolutionary 
thoughts were seen in the Balkans. The republican regime of France which invaded 
the Venice in 1797 and then spread through the Dalmatia, became a neighbor of the 
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Ottomans. A new power struggle started in the Mediterranean with Napoleon’s 
Egypt campaign in 1798. During this process, Tepedelenli Ali Pasha with his 
Albanian mercenaries at the struggles in Dalmatia1 and Mehmed Ali Pasha with his 
Albanian mercenaries in at the struggles in Egypt had crucial roles.2 Also, the fame 
of the Albanian mercenaries spread out of the Ottoman borders.3 
Serbs were the first nation that had revolt in the Balkans (1804). This revolt 
suppressed easily with the support of the Albanian mercenaries because of the lack 
of European support for the Serbians.4 At that time, Sultan Selim III was dethroned 
and killed because of his reform policies and the new Sultan, Mahmud II (1808-
1839) came face to face with a chaos situation. The Albanian mercenaries were 
continuing their services during the Russo-Turkish War between 1806 and 1812 and 
for the state rulers, while Mahmud II succeeded to the throne.5  
It is obvious that the Greek Revolt in 1821 was the most serious problem that the 
Ottoman Empire had encountered during the 19th century. The impacts of the revolt 
which had became a European problem and had a religious character, continued 
approximately ten years.6 On the eve of the Greek Revolt, Ottoman rule in Albania 
                                                          
1 Tepedelenli Ali Pasha and his Albanian soldiers were efficient at the fights in Corfu Island. 
The Albanian soldiers were successful to capture Corfu and other Ionian Islands (Seven 
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Câbi Ömer Efendi, Tarih, pp. 58, 91, 125-126. 
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occupation. So, the Albanians were familiar with this region. The need fort he mercenaries 
increased during the French occupation. The biggest Albanian mercenary group, which 
came to Egypt at that time, was under the command of Çarhacı Tahir Pasha, who was also 
an Albanian. Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Aga (Pasha) was in this group as serçeşm/sergerde (head 
man/sergeant). The Albanian mercenaries became a significant factor at the rivalries 
between Egyptian Mamluks, governors from the center and Mehmed Ali Pasha of Kavala. 
Al last, Mehmed Ali Pasha, who had the support of the Albanian and Kırcali mercenaries, 
became the governor of Egypt. By the way, the most important activity of Mehmed Ali 
Pasha in the eyes of the empire was breaking down the Albanian influence in Egypt. See: 
Yüksel Çelik, Hüsrev Mehmed Pasha, Siyasi Hayatı ve Askeri Faaliyetleri (1756-1855), 
(İÜ. Institute of Social Sciences, PhD Thesis), Istanbul 2005, pp. 28, 33-34, 38-62; Câbi 
Ömer Efendi, Tarih, p. 91. 
3 Austrian Emperor demanded mercenaries from the Ottoman Empire during the Italian 
campaign of France. With the petition which had reached to Sublime Porte by the 
ambassador of Austria in Galata, to Sublime Porte he demanded 50,000 mercenaries from 
the Ottomans. Half of these soldiers would be Turkish and the rest would be Albanian. They 
would be given 50 piasters per month as a salary and 50 paras for daily needs. The Ottomans 
refused this offer because of the Serbian revolt in 1804: Câbi Ömer Efendi, Tarih, c. I, pp. 
526-527. 
4 Câbi Ömer Efendi, Tarih, vol. I, p. 448. 
5 Tepedelenli Ali Pasha fought against the Russian army in the Balkans together with his son 
Muhtar Pasha and his 15,000 Albanian soldiers: Câbi Ömer Efendi, Tarih, vol. I, p. 448. 
6 Ali Fuat Örenç, Balkanlarda İlk Dram: Unuttuğumuz Mora Türkleri ve Eyaletten 
Bağımsızlığa Yunanistan, Istanbul 2009, p. 27-200. 
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was tenuous. In a decade that roughly corresponded to the Greek War of 
Independence, but actually preceding and succeeding it, the Ottoman government 
moved with great energy to bring Albania into the centre’s orbit1. Albanian soldiers 
and their leaders should be mentioned as the most significant actors of the revolt 
process. Christian (Orthodox) Albanians, who were supporting the Greek rebels and 
also Muslim Gheg (Gega) and Tosk (Toska) Albanians,2 who were become 
indispensable parts of the Ottoman Army, had crucial roles in this long struggle.3 
Rules of Employing the Albanian Warriors in the Ottoman Army: “Kâ’ide-i 
Arnavudiyye” 
 
Ottoman Army recruited the Albanian warriors mostly from the Gheg dynasty in the 
north and Tosk dynasty in the south.4 Actually, there had been a serious rivalry 
between these dynasties.5 Sometimes, this rivalry affected the army. Ottoman rulers 
tried to balance the situations while making appointments like governors and army 
commanders and they tried to choose the persons who were familiar with the 
psychology of the Albanian warriors.6 
 
Ottoman records described the Albanian soldiers as brave, fearless, heroic, hard 
and warlike.7 Albanians served in the army as infantry and cavalry.8 They were 
successful at the guerilla fights because of their life styles and for this reason they 
were chosen.9 The state also got pack animals, if needed, from the Albanian regions 
with money.10 
Some problems had started to appear in time while the number and influence areas 
of the Albanian mercenaries increased. Main problem, caused by the Albanian 
mercenaries during the 18th and 19th centuries was the failure of paying their 
salaries. Also, some serious problems which were caused because of the failure of 
the payments occurred in the battlefield during the Greek revolt in 1821 and that 
                                                          
1 Hakan Erdem, ““Perfidious Albanians” and “Zealous Governors”: Ottomans, Albanians 
and Turks in The Greek War of Independence”, Ottoman Rule and The Balkans, 1760-1850: 
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use the Albanian sources). 
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pp. 183-188. 
4 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XI, pp. 121-125. 
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6 BOA, HAT, no. 39928; Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 80-82, 104-106. 
7 BOA, C. AS, no. 25527; Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 121-125. Douglas Dakin, The 
Grek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833), London 1973, pp. 72-73. 
8 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 46-52. 
9 G. Yıldız, Neferin Adı Yok, s. 227-228. 
10 BOA, HAT, no. 40285-E. 
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disturbed the government so much1. On the other hand, Albanian warriors, who had 
not any choice except being a mercenary because of the geographical properties of 
Albania,2 mentioned the problems while they could not get their payments in time.3 
So, a regulation, called kâ’ide-i Arnavudiyye4 had been prepared for solving the 
problems of employing the Albanian mercenaries. 5 
The state, while it needed soldiers for a war or a rebellion, tried to contact 
(mukâvele) with the Albanian dynasty leaders and the chiefs of the warriors with 
the help of local rulers6. Both sides had to agree on requirements, had determined 
before, for the Albanian mercenaries to get a position in the army or in the service 
of a local ruler. Some of the significant requirements were the amount of the salary, 
duration of the employment and describing the battlefield. These requirements 
which were determined after the negotiations with the Albanian leaders (called 
pazarlık), organized as a contract (mukavele) or a voucher (senet).7 Albanian 
leaders, who also, demanded same ranks for themselves, did not start their service 
before the end of the contract process.8 This contract was confirmed to the qadı 
(kadı) of the region.9 Payment bills called as tahvil and prepared for the payments 
of each soldiers, were dated for two months periods (ulufe).10 
Albanian infantry and cavalries, who provided their arms by themselves,11 fight for 
a period of 2 months,12 4 months13 or maximum 6 months14, so called seasonal. If 
they collected as summer combination, they left the battlefield absolutely at 
November and they went their homes in contrast to the significance of the current 
military situation. Especially, Ghegs behaved not according to the states agenda but 
the context of the contract. In this situation, the state had to collect new soldiers for 
winter combination.15 This situation, as seen during the Greek Revolt in 1821, 
caused serious problems and great losses during the critical military operations or at 
the services like defending the castles or redoubts.16 And Albanian warriors did not 
                                                          
1 H. Erdem, ““Perfidious Albanians” and “Zealous Governors”:…, pp. 214-237. 
2 BOA, HAT, no. 21513-A. 
3 BOA, HAT, no. 40488; H. Erdem, ““Perfidious Albanians” and “Zealous Governors”:…, 
pp. 214-237. 
4 BOA, C. AS, no. 25527. 
5 BOA, HAT, no. 21513-G; no. 21513-J; no. 37827; no. 40477. 
6 H. Erdem, ““Perfidious Albanians” and “Zealous Governors”:…, p. 214. 
7 BOA, HAT, no. 40477; Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, p. 65; G. Yıldız, Neferin Adı Yok, 
pp. 231-232; H. Erdem, ““Perfidious Albanians” and “Zealous Governors”:…, p. 229. 
8 BOA, HAT, no. 40488; Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, p. 65. 
9 BOA, HAT, no. 38057. 
10 BOA, HAT, no. 40477; C. AS, no. 17011. 
11 G. Yıldız, Neferin Adı Yok, pp. 17-30, 147-149. 
12 BOA, C. AS, no. 25527. 
13 G. Yıldız, Neferin Adı Yok, pp. 147-149. 
14 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 121-125. 
15 BOA, HAT, no. 37770; no. 38723; no. 39855; no. 40503-M; Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. 
XII, pp. 80-82; 104-106. 
16 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 80-82. 
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want to fight at the distances which were for away from their homes collective 
escapes occurred while they were taken to the great distances.1 
It became a tradition to appoint a sergeant (bölükbaşı), a standard-bearer and a non-
commissioned officer to each group of 30 Albanian infantry and cavalry soldiers 
apart from their leaders in order to command them easily.2 And a chieftain (başbuğ) 
was appointed to lead every 1,000 warriors.3 The Albanians, also wanted the 
appointment of a shrewd lieutenant-governor or tipstaff (dirâyetli bir mütesellim 
veya mübaşir) for the possibility of a failure of payments from moment they had 
gathered at their homelands to the moment they had joined the Ottoman Army.4 
They insisted on that this man should be a significant person, so, they could obey 
his authority. Actually, they saw this tipstaff (mübaşir) or lieutenant-governor 
(mütesellim) as a hostage or insurance for their payments.5 For this reason, the son, 
the brother or a significant man of the local ruler had chosen as mübaşir or 
mütesellim.6  
The payments of Albanian warriors were registered at the records as ulufe, harc, 
güzeşte or mahiye determined as monthly and paid per two months after the 
permission of the Sultan.7 The payment records which had showed service duration 
of the warriors in the army and called harc tezkiresi (pay ticket),8 ulufe makbuzu9 or 
tahvil10 were make out when first contract (mukavele) had done. The total number 
of the salary (ulufe/harc/mâhiye), actually mentioned in the contracts. The salaries 
of the warriors did not start when they had registered for the army. Generally they 
had their two salaries in advance before reaching the army.11 Conditioned in the 
contract, sometimes the first payments would be deferred.12 Ulufe payments were 
done by Grandvizier, Commander-in-Chief, or Governors at the army. The 
notebooks which these payments were making out were completed, lastly at the 
desk of Treasury and Chief-accountancy at Sublime Porte.13 
The payments of the Albanian warriors had changed in accordance with being 
infantry or cavalry. The payments of infantries generally had varied on 25 
                                                          
1 BOA, HAT, no. 38329; no. 39964-D; G. Yıldız, Neferin Adı Yok, pp. 233-234; H. Erdem, 
““Perfidious Albanians” and “Zealous Governors”:…, pp. 214-217. 
2 BOA, HAT, no. 21513-A. 
3 BOA, C. AS, no. 25527. 
4 BOA, HAT, no. 38057. 
5 BOA, HAT, no. 38723. 
6 BOA, HAT, no. 38057; no. 38751-A. 
7 BOA, C. AS, no. 17011; no. 21362; no. 25527; Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 80-82. 
8 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 26-29. 
9 BOA, HAT, no. 21577. 
10 BOA, HAT, no. 37941. 
11 BOA, HAT, no. 40488. 
12 BOA, HAT, no. 37941. 
13 BOA, C. AS, no. 17011; no. 21362; no. 25527. 
14 BOA, HAT, no. 38551. 
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30 piasters1, 35 piasters2 and 40 piasters.3 The payments of the cavalries started 
from 40 piasters4 and vary on, according to the situation, up to 250 piasters.5 
Standard-bearers got 40 piasters, sergeants had a payment equal to the ulufe of 5 
soldiers and a pair of bread and a little meal as ration. The indispensable ratio was 
kokoroz, a type of corn bread, for the Albanian soldiers whether they were Muslim 
or not. They got a kıyye of this bread daily.6 A pare from the normal payments of 
salaries, money was distributed as a reward after the success in the battlefield with 
the order of the Sultan.7 The ulufes of the warriors inherited to their sons incase of 
their deaths.8 The bread and meal rations and meşta,9 warriors clothes for winter, 
were provided by Nüzul Emini (Supplies Officer) and Kasapbaşı (Chief-butcher) at 
the army.10 Sometimes, the state got cost of military (asker bedeli) from Rumelia for 
giving the ulufes of the Albanian warriors.11 
When the salaries were paid late or did not paid at all, the Albanian warriors, 
refused to leave the army whether their service duration was lasted or not they had 
demanded extra payment for the delay. This situation had recorded as managing of 
the payments.12 These situations caused serious problems for the Treasury. The 
unpaid soldiers caused serious problems in the army. They could plunder the 
villages and towns or attacked to the high ranked officials.13 
Ottoman commanders and governors used to complain about the Albanian warriors 
and Kırcali soldiers recruited from Gümülcine region (in Thrace) because of these 
serious problems. Government officials generally criticized the warriors for not 
fighting for the state and religion but money.14 These complaints, sometimes by 
Grandvizier or Governor, showed the weakness, fear and mistrust.15 The state, tried 
to solve the discipline problem of the Albanian soldiers stemming from the payment 
                                                          
1 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 26-29. 
2 BOA, HAT, no. 39928; H. Erdem, ““Perfidious Albanians” and “Zealous Governors”:…, 
pp. 221-237. 
3 BOA, HAT, no. 21175-G. 
4 BOA, C. AS, no. 17011; no. 21362. 
5 G. Yıldız, Neferin Adı Yok, pp. s. 121-125. 
6 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp.161-162.  
7 BOA, HAT, no. 39937; Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 26-29. 
8 BOA, C. AS, no. 17011. 
9 BOA, HAT, no. 39855. 
10 BOA, C. AS, no. 25527; Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 26-29. 
11 BOA, HAT, no. 38816. 
12 BOA, HAT, no. 21175-G, no. 39937; no. 39964-D. 
13 For the problems occurred because of the failure of payments look at BOA, HAT, no. 
21175-G; no. 37827; no. 37941; Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 100-101; 121-125; H. 
Erdem, ““Perfidious Albanians” and “Zealous Governors”:…, pp. 214-237. 
14 BOA, HAT, no. 37827; no. 39928; no. 39937; G. Yıldız, Neferin Adı Yok, p. 147-149. 
15 BOA, HAT, no. 38079-A; no. 38557. 
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crisis generally by counseling, sometimes by stressing out the religious discourse 
and rarely by threatening them.1 
It should be mentioned that although employing Albanian soldiers caused serious 
problems, it had financial advantages for the state. In contrast to Janissaries, the 
state did not have to pay them other than the campaign times. They did not have the 
right of retirement or compensation. The most important advantage was that they 
provide all the tool including the arms by themselves.2 
 
The Albanian Mercenaries at Greek Revolt in 1821 
 
It is hard to say that the Ottoman Empire ruled the crisis of the Greek Revolt 
successfully. This failure was presence both in military and diplomacy. As a 
consequence, the Greece, the first independent state at Balkan Peninsula established 
with the support of Europe at the end of the revolt (1830). Because of the false 
strategies, Ottoman Government was unable to get maximum benefits from the 
army and the navy. For this reason, the state had to use, first, the Albanian 
mercenaries and then, well trained Cihadiye soldiers of Mehmed Ali Pasha, the 
governor of Egypt.3 
The Greek Revolt, first, had started in Wallachia (Eflak) and Moldavia (Boğdan) in 
February 1821. Alexander Ipsilantis, the leader of the revolt, chooses this place 
because he was expecting military support from Russia.4 There were Christian 
Albanians,5 called as Kaba Rum (vulgar Greek) in the Ottoman records Serbians, 
Bulgarians and some Romanians with the rebels who left Bucharest.6 Ottoman 
soldiers, easily, repulsed these irregular troops. While the rebellion was suppressed, 
Ipsilanti escaped to Austria and had arrested there in June 26, 1821. The Albanians 
and the Serbians who supported the rebels had dispersed. However, the most of the 
Greek rebels succeeded to reach the Morea Peninsula.7 The Ottoman Empire issued 
fermans for forbidding the employment of the Albanians under the service of the 
                                                          
1 BOA, HAT, no. 40318-E. Also look at G. Yıldız, Neferin Adı Yok, pp. 231-232. 
2 G. Yıldız, Neferin Adı Yok, pp. 147-149. 
3 BOA, HAT, no. 27770; no. 33906-K; no. 38785-C; Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 
Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt, New York 1997, pp. 9- 37, 263-
268; H. Erdem, ““Perfidious Albanians” and “Zealous Governors”:…, pp. 221-237. 
4 Yücel Özkaya, “1821 Yunan (Eflak-Buğdan) İsyanları ve Avrupalıların İsyan Karşısındaki 
Tutumları”, Üçüncü Askeri Tarih Semineri, (Ankara 1986), pp. 115-118. 
5 BOA, HAT, no. 37892-A; Vak’anüvis Ahmed Lûtfî Efendi Tarihi (Ed: Y. Demirel-T. 
Erdoğan), Istanbul 1999, vol. II-III, p. 542. 
6 İlber Ortaylı, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Milliyetçilik”, XIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, 
(Ankara 1999), p. 3. 
7 BOA, HAT, no. 23699; no. 38428; no. 38546; no. 38547; no. 38681; no. 44927-D; no. 
45229-B; no. 45229-D; no. 51343; Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XI, pp. 120, 192-199; 
Şanizade Mehmed Ataullah Efendi, Şâni-zâde Târihi, (Ed. Z. Yılmazer), Istanbul 2008, vol. 
II, pp.1046, 1062, 1265. 
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local rulers1 and the entrance of the Albanians, the Bulgarians and the Serbians to 
the region. The state wanted to send those people who were caught in the region 
without permission, to Rumelia.2 
The second and the significant phase of the revolt started in the Morea Peninsula in 
April 6, 1821 and spread to the Aegean Islands in a short time. While all these were 
happening, the Ottoman rulers were taking the wrong steps which made it easy for 
the Greek rebels. The state sent all the troops on Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, the 
governor of Yanya when the revolt had started.3 A year before the revolt, Sultan 
Mahmud II had dismissed Ali Pasha, in accordance with his policy of eliminating 
local powers who were in rivalry with the state an then, pasha had upraised at 
March 23, 1820 and came into contact with the Greeks.4 This situation prepared 
suitable atmosphere for the rebels, because Ali Pasha had suppressed the Greeks 
with his son, Veli Pasha, the governor of Morea for a long time5 and was following 
every development closely.6 The Ottoman soldiers in the Morea Peninsula and the 
Aegean islands were sent to Yanya because of Ali Pasha incident under the 
command of Hurşid Pasha. There were 12,000 Ottoman soldiers in the whole 
Morea Peninsula, and most of them were Albanian mercenaries.7 
Tepedelenli Ali Pasha incident affected the employment of the Albanian 
mercenaries for the Ottoman army negatively. There were Gheg Albanians under 
the command of Mustafa Pasha, the governor of Scutari, in the army which had sent 
to Yanya.8 Tosk Albanians, famous for guerilla fights, were under the siege with 
                                                          
1 Wallachia-Moldavia (Eflak-Boğdan or Memleketeyn) voyvodas, from Feneriot families in 
Istanbul, had a lot of Christian Albanians under their service before the revolt. They sent, 
nearly, 50 Albanians to 10 or 15 villages for obtaining the public order and collecting taxes. 
However, people complained about them. There were Albanian influence in the cities. Thus, 
the Russian consul at Bucharest wrote that the city was under the control of the Albanians 
while Ipsilantis, the leader of the revolt, arrived. See: BOA, HAT, no. 45390-D; no. 45424; 
no. 45516; no. 45685-Ç.  
2 BOA, HAT, no. 38779-A; no. 45453-A; Cevdet Hariciye (C. HAR), no. 3283; no. 5314. 
3 N. Bozbaba, Osmanlı Yönetiminde Arnavutlar …, pp. 115-134. 
4 Christian Albanians came for help when Ali Pasha of Tepelena called the Greeks for an 
alliance. People from Odisa Andruco, Karaiskaki, Varnacioti, Athanas Dhiako, Gura, Griva, 
Gardhicioti, Vangel Zapa, Bakola ve Boçari ve Cavela families which were significant 
actorsof the Grek revolt joined Ali Pashas army (see: Aristidh Kola, Arvanitet dhe 
Prejardhja Greke, Botimet TOENA, Tirane 2008, p. 363). Also, Kakosil Greeks from Corfu 
Island sent support to Tepedelenli: BOA, HAT, no. 20928; Şanizade Mehmed Ataullah 
Efendi, Tarih, vol. II, pp. 1012-1013. 
5 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih-i Cevdet, Istanbul 1309, vol. XI, pp. 72-73. 
6 BOA, HAT, no. 38811-E; no. 38811-F. 
7 Sture Linner, W. H. Humphreys’ First “Journal of The Greek War of Independence” (July 
1821-February 1822), Stockholm 1967, pp. 5-10; A. F. Örenç, Balkanlar’da …., pp. 28-29, 
32-33. 
8 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XI, pp. 153. 
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Tepedelenli Ali Pasha.1 Apart from that, some Christian Albanians, who were 
together with Ali Pasha before, passed to Morea Peninsula and started to fight 
against the Ottoman Army with the Greeks at the front lines.2 
It had heard that there were 100,000 armed Greeks in the Morea Pelinsula at the 
beginning of the revolt. There were a lot of Christian Albanians in this number. 
Some soldiers and officers from Europe joined the rebels voluntarily. Also, together 
with Hydira (Çamlıca) and Spetsai (Suluca) which had a significant Albanian 
population, most of the Aegean Islands supported the revolt.3 Because of the Greek 
pirates in the Aegean, logistic support to Morea by the Ottoman Navy became 
harder.4 
When the Ottoman officials heard the revolt, it headed towards to the Albanian 
mercenaries because of the problems caused by the janissaries. Although it tried to 
collect soldiers from Anatolia and Rumelia at the beginning of the revolt, a lot of 
difficulties had occurred. As a result the Morean army largely consisted of the 
Albanian mercenaries and their numbers had reached to 40,000. The state started to 
assign the persons who knew the Albanian traditions, as the rulers or the 
commanders.5 
The Greek Revolt progressed according to the program of Philiki Eteria 
Committee,6 which also had some Orthodox Albanian members. The first 
movements appeared at around of Kalavryta, Argos, Nauplio, Patras, Corinth and 
Vestice. =0These first attacks were suppressed with the help of the soldiers who had 
come from the army in Yanya and some cities which were under the siege were 
saved.7 
The biggest Muslim massacres had occurred in Tripoli (Tripoliçe) city during the 
Greek Revolt. Tripoli, administrative center of Morean Peninsula, had a significant 
number Muslim population. Apart from this, after the beginning of the revolt, 
Morean Muslims, including Albanians, and the Jews went to Tripoli as refugees. 
So, the population of the city passed 40,000. At the beginning, there were 1,700 
Albanian mercenaries under the command of Elmas Aga in Tripoli.8 Then, 3,500 
soldiers had transferred from Yanya to Tripoli. The leader of the rebels at the region 
                                                          
1 For more information look at: Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XI, pp. 43-49, 50-55, 153; A. F. 
Örenç, Balkanlar’da …., pp. 27-61. 
2 A. Kola, Arvanitet dhe Prejardhja Greke, p. 363. 
3 A. Kola, Arvanitet dhe Prejardhja Greke, pp.127-200. 
4 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 91-93; A. F. Örenç, Balkanlar’da …., p. 63 and other 
pages. 
5 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XI, pp. 50-55; A. F. Örenç, Balkanlar’da …, p. 167. 
6 A. Kola, Arvanitet dhe Prejardhja Greke, p. 223. The significant member of The Philiki 
Eteria Committee in Rumelia like Andruco, Kacioni and Mitromara were Albanians: A. 
Kola, Arvanitet dhe Prejardhja Greke, s. 223. 
7 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XI, p. 148 
8 S. Linner, W. H. Humphreys’ First …, pp. 60-61; D. Dakin, The Greek Struggle…, pp. 66-
68. 
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was Theodhoros Kolokotronis, a Christian Albanian.1 The Greeks surrounded 
Tripoli in the autumn of 1821. The city was sieged by 60,000 rebels for 5 months. 
The people in the city made a treaty with the rebels because of the lack of support 
from the state. According to this treaty, the Muslims in the city would be transferred 
to the Albanian shores in return for 5 million piasters. However, Elmas Aga, the 
leader of the Albanian mercenaries, in the city made a secret contract with the 
rebels. According to this, the Albanian mercenaries opened the gates of the city for 
the rebels at the night of October 10, 1821.2 While the Albanian mercenaries were 
going out, the Greek rebels had entered the city. The Greeks made a terrible 
massacre. Approximately 40,000 people, consists of Turks, Albanians and Jews got 
slaughtered by the Greek rebels.3 This particular betrayal of the Albanian warriors 
was mentioned during the rebellion when a problem related with them had 
occurred.4 The relationship between Kolokotronis and Elmas Aga was explained in 
a letter, which had caught, written by Kolokotronis, addressing the Muslim 
Albanians.5  
Commander-in-chief Hurşid Pasha, who had suppressed the Tepedelenli Ali Pasha 
incident, was sent to Morea with his soldiers after Tripoli massacre. And also, 
Mahmud Pasha of Dhrama, who had collected soldiers from Albanian region, went 
to the peninsula. The population of the army reached 25,000. Approximately 4,000 
infantry and cavalry of Albanian mercenaries were included to the army. They 
would be under the command of Zekeriya Debre. By the way, all Albanian soldiers 
were counted and had given to the command of Zekeriya Debre. Total number of 
the Albanian mercenaries reached 7,000. However, Hurşid Pasha demanded money, 
equal to the 40,000 soldiers’ ulufe from the Sublime Porte.6 
The prepared army went on Livadhia (Livadya) and Thebes (İstefe), where the 
situation was very critical. The successful operations were done up to Modon 
(Methoni). However, the first crisis with the Albanian warriors had occurred. While 
the army was marching on Nauplio –at the inner side of Morea-, Zekeriya Debre 
demanded 16.000 piasters salary for his warriors from Nüzul Emini. Although 
Nüzul Emini Yakup Aga told that there was no money, he could not convince them. 
Thereupon, the Albanians started to squeeze Dramalı Mahmud Pasha. And Pasha 
swore that there was not any money but, also, he could not convince Zekeriya 
Debre. Actually, this problem did not occur not only because of the money. The 
rivalry between the Albanian dynasties in the army had increased.7 Zekeriya Debre 
                                                          
1 For the letter of Kolokotronis: BOA, HAT, no. 39917-R; H. Erdem, ““Perfidious 
Albanians” and “Zealous Governors”:…, pp. 224-225, 238-239. 
2 S. Linner, W. H. Humphreys’ First …, pp. 60-62. 
3 BOA, C. DAH, no. 14244; Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 24-25, 220-221; A. F. 
Örenç, Balkanlar’da …., pp. 38-39. 
4 BOA, HAT, no. 40503-M. 
5 BOA, HAT, no. 39917-R. 
6 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 46-52. 
7 Zekeriya Debre, the leader of the Albanian mercenaries did not want to obey Dramalı 
Mahmud Pasha, because of being a member of a different dynasty. While the assignments 
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used this situation as an excuse and started to declare that they would not obey and 
would go back if the money did not get paid. Salary crisis was grown up while the 
army was at Argos. At this situation, the Albanian leaders who gave soldiers to the 
army and Erib Pasha made a secret conversation with Zekeriya Debre. Albanian 
leaders agreed on leaving Dramalı Mahmud Pasha and going to Corinth. They took 
their tents and soldiers without spending anytime and left the army. Morean 
Commander-in-chief did not have any information about the situation. Everything 
was learned in the morning. Hundreds of Albanians, who escaped at night, were 
attacked by the Greeks and went back to the garrison. The army had reached 
Nauplio with these problems.1 
The Governor of Morea sent a letter to the Sublime Porte and demanded money for 
the Albanians’ ulufes. The Albanian warriors wanted all their money. They attacked 
to the residence of the governor. The governor sold all his households and paid 
some of their money and got some time for the rest of the payment. He mentioned 
that serious problems would be occurred if he could not find money of 1.500 scrip 
(kese) 2 in a specific time. Hurşid Pasha, who had faced with the same problems, 
wanted to make the payments to the Albanians after they had reached the army to 
prevent the escapes and rumors about the ratios of the payments.3 
Although the Albanian warriors caused serious problems, the state needed them, 
because of the Greek uprising spreading on daily basis. Thus, at the beginning of 
the year 1822, the state started to increase the number of the Albanian mercenaries 
in the army. At that time, borderline problems occurred with Iran (Persia) and the 
state started to collect soldiers for the Eastern Army. After the first year of the 
revolt, Ali Pasha, the Commander-in-chief of Morea, other viziers in the region and 
the other high rank officials made a meeting at Lamia (İzdin) and evaluated the 
situation. The Pashas prepared a report pointing the Albanian mercenaries as the 
main factor of the failure and sent it to Sublime Porte. According to the high ranked 
officials, the main advantage of the rebels was the geographical conditions. They 
would hide at the steep passages and repulse the Ottoman soldiers. At the meeting, 
Ali Şefik Pasha said that the rebels were fighting for religion but the Albanians 
warriors were fighting for money. And he mentioned that it was possible for the 
Albanian =0warriors to change their sides if they could not get their payments. 
Logistic shortages were also discussed at Lamia meeting. The viziers determined 
that at least 80,000 soldiers and 10.000 pack animals were needed for the success in 
Morea. Despite all these critics, employment of the Albanian mercenaries continued 
                                                                                                                                                     
for Morea were done, the balance between the dynasties did not consider because of the 
Sultan’s adviser Halet Efendi. While the important positions were given to the small 
dynasties, the members of the bigger dynasties did not spend too much effort: Ahmed 
Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 59-62. 
1 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 46-52. 
2 1 Ottoman scrip (kese) income 500 piasters (guruş). 
3 BOA, HAT, no. 38557; no. 38573. 
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and 10,000 soldiers were registered in 10 days time though just 7,000 of them 
reached to the battlefield.1 
It was heard that Kolokotronis, the main responsible of Tripoli massacre, was 
around and his letters to the Albanian commanders in the Ottoman Morean army 
were captured. Kolokotronis described the Albanians as brothers and his sadness 
about their attacks on him. He claimed that he was loyal to the contract that he had 
made between them and he demanded a meeting by mentioning he had a lot of 
Albanian friends like Elmas Aga in Tripoli.2 
Dramalı Mahmud Pasha, a Muslim Albanian leader, was assigned for fighting with 
Kolokotronis who was around Lamia. The Albanian warriors were encouraged and 
promised ulufe for fighting better. Mahmud Pasha and his army succeeded in the 
war around Badracık against Kolokotronis. More than 3,000 rebels were killed. 
Because of their success, Sultan Mahmud II ordered to distribute the money of 
2.000 scrip to the Albanian mercenaries. This money, distributed instead of ulufes, 
was made up of 12.5 gold. So, every soldier got one more piasters.3 
Although the Ottoman pashas pointed out the Albanian mercenaries as the main 
source of the problems, in general, there did not exist strict military discipline in the 
army. The coordination of the scattered troops was failing and the escapes could not 
be prevented. Also, there were rivalries between the governors and the commanders 
in the region. Logistic problem of Morean Peninsula was increasing day by day. 
Especially, lack of stuff and money were at the extreme point. Also, the rivalries 
between Tosk and Gheg Albanians in the army had increased.4 Dramalı Mahmud 
Pasha assigned as the governor of Morea and Commander-in-chief for solving these 
problems in June, 1822.5 At that time, the Greek rebels gathered an assembly at 
Epidor and declared their independence.6 
The Ottoman Empire decided to focus on Euboea Island, a strategic point and 
Mesolongi, captured by the rebels, in 1823. Although Omer Pasha, the guard of 
Euboea was reluctant, the Albanian warriors were sent there.7 It had seen that Omer 
Pasha was right. Thus, the Albanian warriors, accommodated in the villages, started 
to leave their places for going to Euboea to demand their payments when they heard 
about the payments at other places. Although Ali Pasha warned them to go back, 
they did not obey to him. Because of this they were forced to go back, but most of 
them escaped to Lamia region. Ali Pasha wrote the situation to Sublime Porte and 
                                                          
1 BOA, HAT, no. 37948; Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 26-29. 
2 BOA, HAT, no. 915-39917-R; . Erdem, ““Perfidious Albanians” and “Zealous 
Governors”:…, pp. 224, 238-239. 
3 BOA, HAT, no. 927/40277-A; Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 26-29. 
4 BOA, HAT, no. 38787-R. 
5 BOA, HAT, no. 37927; 38332; no. 38681; no. 38877; no. 39106. 
6 A. F. Örenç, Balkanlar’da …, pp. 56. 
7 BOA, HAT, no. 40285-F. 
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demanded approximately 2,000 Kurdish infantry soldiers from Anatolia for a 
successful campaign because of the geographical properties of Euboea land.1 
The city of Mesolongi had also a symbolic importance, like Euboea for the Greeks. 
It was a strong castle at the Gulf of Lepanto in the south western coast of Morean 
Peninsula. There was, nearly, 10 miles long swamp at around. The rebels took some 
precautions to prevent the progress of the Ottoman Army. There were a lot of 
voluntary rebels from Europe in Mesolongi, which had a naval defense possibility. 
Despite the precautions, the army could not start the Mesolongi campaign. 
Especially, the disobedience of the Gheg Albanians under the command of İşkodralı 
Mustafa Pasha, was a great problem. Those soldiers, who were collected at summer, 
refused to fight in November and went back their homes. After their return, the 
navy reached to the region for the support, but they could not find Mustafa Pasha 
and left the region for an attack on Psara Island.2 Because of this situation, the 
Greeks increased the level of their attacks towards the towns and villages around. 
The situation turned to negative at all fronts. Also, the rigorous behaviors of the 
Commander-in-chief against the Gheg Albanians caused some complaints.3 So, a 
change had occurred at the command element.4 Firstly, Berkofçalı Yusuf Pasha, 
who went to Preveze and had collected 10,000 Tosk Albanians but failed at the 
campaign at the inner parts of Morea while the Mesolongi issue was waiting, was 
dismissed.5  
While the conditions were getting worse at Morea, the borderline problems with 
Iran turned to a confliction process in 1823. The state, started to collect mercenaries 
because of the mistrust against the janissaries. Thus, the commander of the Eastern 
Army opposed to collect soldiers from ordinary people and advised to get Albanian 
and Kırcali infantry from Rumelia. According to this, he asked if possible 10,000 
soldiers, and if not at least 5,000 soldiers from Istanbul, under the conditions of the 
                                                          
1 BOA, HAT, no. 39883-E; no. 39913-G. 
2 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 80-82. 
3 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 95-97. 
4 For more information look at: BOA, HAT, no. 25591; no. 32917; no. 38129-B; no. 38218-
H; no. 38260; no. 38281; no. 38316; no. 38348; no. 38358; no. 38773-İ; no. 38382; no. 
38618; no. 38851; no. 39966. 
5 According to Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, a historian and a statesman, Yusuf Pasha of Siroz, a 
member of an Albanian dynasty, wanted to be the conqueror of Morea. Although he had 
moner, he did not have enough soldiers. For this reason, he went to Preveze and started to 
collect Albanian mercenaries. At that time, Omer Vryoni Pasha, the governor of Yanya, 
offered Yusuf Pasha collecting the mercenaries by himself and acting together. However, 
Yusuf Pasha who was giving the money did not accept him as a partner without any money. 
Yusuf Pasha made meetings with the Albanian leaders directly and collected 10,000 
Albanian mercenaries. Then, he moved towards Morea with his soldiers. Collecting Tosc 
soldiers by Yusuf Pasha disturbed Omer Vryoni Pasha who was a member of Tosk dynasty. 
He criticized Yusuf Pasha for going to Morea while the Mesolongi issue was continuing. He 
communicated with the soldiers in Yusuf Pasha’s army secretly. A chaos occurred in the 
army of Yusuf Pasha near Mesolongi and the soldiers escaped for Preveze: Ahmed Cevdet, 
Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 80-82. 
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payments would be given by the Şark Defterdarı. Those soldiers, under the 
command of the famous leaders would be transferred from Saloniki and Gallipoli to 
Erzurum but the plan failed. They couldn’t find any Kırcali soldier because all of 
them were sent to Morea and had some problems for getting Albanian soldiers 
because of the situation at Rumelia.1 
Ottoman Army used the Albanian warriors not only on land but also at the naval 
campaigns. For example, there were Albanian warriors at the navy which was sent 
to Psara Island for a campaign. İsmail Pasha, the governor (mutasarrıf) of 
Akarnania and Lepanto, organized the soldier collection for Psara. He took 3,000 
Albanian soldiers that he collected at Lamia to Saloniki. Those soldiers were taken 
to Ipsala by the navy under the command of Grand Admiral Mehmed Hüsrev Pasha. 
The Albanian warriors succeeded at Psara. Approximately a thousand rebels were 
killed, 500 of rebels were captured and a lot of booty was taken after a nine-hour 
clash.2 
Although a victory had won in Psara, the army could not reach a successful result at 
Morea during 1823 and 1824. The commanders were changed a lot for the success 
and it prevented the continuity of the campaigns. The under-trained Ottoman 
soldiers who were sent to Morea in groups caused significant questions. Payment 
problems of the Albanian warriors continued increasingly.3 Apart from this, logistic 
problems could not solve and the soldiers lost their enthusiasm. At the last stage, the 
state started to make true steps. At first, they made a research and the archival 
records of Morea for determining the old victories to establish a successful strategy 
to suppress the rebellion. They pointed out how the former revolts had suppressed 
in Morea and the transformation points were used before.4 They pointed out that 
Albanian soldiers had used to suppress former revolts in the region but the 
differences of the old and current Albanian soldiers and the current Albanians’ 
focus on money were mentioned. At this point, the state decided to use another 
method which also used before. Thus, solving the Morea problem was offered to 
Mehmed Ali Pasha, the governor of Egypt and a contract was signed after the 
bargains.5 
Mesolongi remained at the first place in campaigns on Morea during 1824. 
However, the Albanian soldiers did not spend much effort because of the payment 
failures. Yusuf Pasha of Siroz demanded permission for collecting soldiers and 
                                                          
1 BOA, HAT, no. 37309-A; G. Yıldız, Neferin Adı Yok, pp. 158-160. 
2 BOA, HAT, no. 38713; Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 95-97. 
3 BOA, HAT, no. 38751; no. 39539-E; Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 22-23; H. Erdem, 
““Perfidious Albanians” and “Zealous Governors”:…, pp. 225-233. 
4 3,000 Albanian mercenaries used for suppressing the revolt of the Greeks in Morea during 
the Russo-Turkish Was in 1768-1774. Although the balance was broke down because of the 
Albanian soldiers, the state started to exract the armed groups from Morea and Cezayirli 
Gazi Hasan Pasha was appointed as the governor of Morea fort his mission: A. F. Örenç, 
Balkanlar’da …, pp. 22-23. 
5 A. F. Örenç, Balkanlar’da …, pp. 47-49. 
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solving the Morean problem before the Egyptian soldiers’ arrive but his demand 
was refused. At that time, Kasapbaşı Hasan Pasha was sent to Lepanto region. 
There was a critical situation at that region. When Hasan Pasha went to the castle, 
he came across with Zekeriya Debre and his men who were demanding money. 
When Hasan Pasha said that he had no money with him, they locked him in a room 
and threatened him for giving him to the rebels or rending unless they could not get 
their payments.1 They were giving a bread to him daily. Ali Pasha, the former 
Grandvizier, who met with the Albanian warriors, said that he could not have any 
money except a tobacco pipe, some jewelry and offered a valuable dagger for their 
payments. However, the Albanians insisted on cash and locked Ali Pasha in a room, 
too. Ali Pasha sold his valuable dagger with a price of 50.000 piasters and 
distributed the money to the soldiers for getting out of this situation. However, the 
money afforded only the half of the payments of the Albanians. When the situation 
was reported to Istanbul, the Sultan sent 75.000 piasters to Ali Pasha. He distributed 
all of the money and saved himself from the Albanians and went to Larissa through 
Preveze. Ali Pasha was dismissed because of these events. Hasan Pasha was saved 
by Omer Vryoni, the governor (mutasarrıf) of Yanya. Hasan Pasha was appointed to 
Arta (Narda) and 75.000 piasters was sent for the payments.2 Meantime, Zekeriya 
Debre, caused a lot of problems for the payments, was secretly executed at Istanbul 
where he went to collect his wages.3 
While the army focused on Mesolongi, a council had gathered in Istanbul in order to 
discuss the situation at Morea. The significant topic of the meeting was the situation 
of the Albanian warriors in the army. High rank officials mentioned the necessity of 
employing the mercenaries because of not having a regular army. At this point, it 
was decided to assign a powerful vizier, who knew the characteristics of the 
Albanians, as the Commander-in-Chief of Rumelia to make them fighting with 
more enthusiasm and Mehmed Reshid Pasha, the governor of Vidin, was selected 
for this mission. In addition to Rumelia state, Yanya and Devline districts, and 
Derbentler Nezâreti (mountain passes) were given under the control of Mehmed 
Reshid Pasha for increasing his position and authority. All the government officials 
at the region would be under his command. Saloniki and Kavala were given to 
Omer Vryoni Pasha as taking care of the balance between the dynasties. So, the 
                                                          
1 BOA, HAT, no. 39966. 
2 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 100-101. 
3 Zekeriya Debre was appointed to the Morean army by Commander-in-Chief Hurşid Pasha. 
However, he caused some problems because of the failure of the payments and he behaved 
insulting to the viziers. He also disturbed Sirozi Yusuf Pasha. The payments of Zekeriya 
Debre became a problem again, after the death of Hurşid Pasha in 1823. The state 
determined the situation as a chance for solving the problem. A paper was given to Zekeriya 
Debre that he could get his payments from the estates of Hurşid Pasha of from the state 
treasury in Istanbul. He went to Istanbul for taking his payments. He went to Grandvizier 
with his papers. Grandvizier sent him to Defterdar Efendi. His issue was extanded because 
of his behaviors to the viziers in Morea. Zekeriya Debre went to Sadaret Kethüdası and 
insulted him. He was arrested because of this. The, he was brought to the castle of 
Bosphorus and executed secretly: Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 101-103. 
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assignments that the Albanians would like had been done.1 On the other hand, 
employing the Kırcali soldiers and Turkish soldiers (Türk uşağı) instead of 
Albanian mercenaries was discussing by the high rank officials. However, the 
inconsistency of them to the Morean climate and dying of the most of them because 
of the diseases made it hard to use them in the region.2 
The state continued to take the decisions to make the Albanians happy. The farms of 
Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, which were transferred to the treasury, had given to some 
Albanian leaders. And 50.000 piasters and a sable fur were given to Palaslızade 
İsmail Pasha as a gift, who had joined the siege of Psara Island with Captain Pasha. 
He was promised the rank of vizierate and the governor of Yanya if he could be 
successful at Mesolongi. Some fermans were sent to some of the Albanian leaders 
like Osman Bey, the lieutenant-governor (mütesellim) of Vlora (Avlonya) and 
Ismail Aga, for promotion. All of them would be under the control of the 
Commander-in-Chief of Rumelia. Payments for military service were started at the 
Rumelian towns to afford the salaries of the Albanian warriors. And the orders were 
sent to the rulers of Skopje, Prizreni, Kruseva (Alacahisar), Pristina, Stip (İştib), 
Kastoria (Kesriye) and Manastır to collect more Albanian warriors. Mustafa Pasha 
of Scutari (İşkodralı) was prepared 5,000 soldiers. Kasapbaşı Hasan Pasha, who had 
problems with the Albanian soldiers at Lepanto, was invited to Preveze and 
assigned to the protection of Arta (Narda). After these precautions, Commander-in-
Chief Mehmed Reshid Pasha left Vidin for going to Morea and reached quickly. He 
stayed there for ten days and went to Yanya. At that time, an amount of money 
consisted of 2.500 scrip was sent to him from the treasury.3 
Mehmed Reshid Pasha decided to walk on Mesolongi at March 1825, because the 
escapes had increased in the army. The navy was assigned to transfer the goods 
which would be needed for the siege. Reshid Pasha reached Mesolongi by defeating 
the resistance on his way. While the siege of Mesolongi was continuing, the 
Egyptian soldiers under the command of Ibrahim Pasha, the new governor of Morea 
and the son of Mehmed Ali Pasha, the governor of Egypt, moved towards to 
Modon. Christian Albanians were supporting the rebels there. Despite this, the 
Egyptian troops got, first, Modon, then Koroni and Navarino.4 
Reshid Pasha felt the relief with the good news from Ibrahim Pasha and fastened his 
preparations. Cihadiye soldiers from Egypt reached Mesolongi at February 25, 
1826. Indeed, there were a lot of Albanian irregular soldiers in the Egyptian army. 
They were in that army from the French occupation and they were so experienced. 
Those soldiers who were under the command of Ibrahim Pasha were so disciplined 
in contrast to the Albanian soldiers in the Morean army.5 At this time, Sublime 
                                                          
1 Ahmed Cevdet, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 104-106. 
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Porte decided to send Mustafa Pasha, the governor (mutasarrıf) of Alexandria to 
Akarnania and Misolongi with Gheg Albanians, while Omer Pasha, the mutasarrıf 
of Yanya, had moved for Athens with Tosk Albanians. Fermans were sent to them. 
However, the governor of Rumelia opposed to these assignments and mentioned 
that he did not trust Omer Pasha. Then, the Sultan declared that he would be made 
changes after he got the information about this distrust.1 
A new problem occurred while the army was at the gates of Mesolongi. The 
commanding position of Tosk Albanians, who joined the siege in great numbers, 
became a problem. The leader of them Avlonyalı İsmailpashazade Mirimiran 
Süleyman Pasha was inefficient. Palaslızade İsmail Pasha, who had some promises 
at Istanbul, was provoking the Albanian leaders secretly. The Albanian leaders 
declared to the Commander-in-Chief that they would fight selflessly if they would 
be under the command of Ismail Pasha. Reshid Pasha did not like their oppressive 
behaviors. At that time, the escape of Süleyman Pasha without any permission was 
heard. At this situation, Reshid Pasha gave a vizierate rank to Ismail Pasha and 
inscribed it to Sublime Porte. Reshid Pasha wanted to do something before the 
winter and he accepted this situation for this reason. Especially, it was impossible to 
keep the Gheg soldiers in the army after November. The payments of Tosk soldiers 
were accumulated. When the Egyptian troops had reached to Mesolongi, Mehmed 
Reshid Pasha started his campaign for Mesolongi with saying “Anyone who says I 
am a follower of Prophet Muhammed, follows me!”.2 First, Vasilika and Andilikoz 
islands which were important for the capture of Mesolongi were taken at March 10-
14, 1826. A lot of arms and booty were taken from these islands.3 
The payments of Albanians in the army became a problem again before the last 
attack to Mesolongi. They said that they would not fight unless they got their 
payments and they wanted to go back their homes because of their contracts were 
expired. They demanded their former payments and then, they demanded for the 
next 3 or 4 months’ payments in cash. They declared that they would go wherever 
the commander wanted if they could get their payments. At this point, the governor 
of Rumelia went to Yanya and called the Albanian leaders for a meeting. The most 
of beys from Devlina had come to the meeting. Pasha told them that England, 
France and Russia were attacking to the Muslims in cooperation with the Greeks 
and they were aiming to remove Islam out of the world. He said that, at those hard 
days, Muslim brothers should not take care of money and offered them to join the 
army without demanding any payment but their foods would be given by the state. 
However, the Albanian leaders declared that they would not fight without money 
but they could provide 500 horses from all the Albanian sancaks for carrying rations 
during three months without any money.4 
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Reshid Pasha went back to the army. Mesolongi was surrounded from the land and 
the sea. However, same problems started to occur between the Albanian warriors 
and cihadiye soldiers of Egypt. It postponed the capture of Mesolongi for a while. 
Albanian warriors, who saw that the Egyptian soldiers got a lot of booty at the last 
campaigns, want to make the first attempt. Ibrahim Pasha and Mehmed Reshid 
Pasha discussed the situation and gave them a mission to capture a monastery on the 
north of Mesolongi. The rebels built a few bastions in the monastery which was in a 
lake. The Albanian warriors could not capture the monastery. Commander-in-Chief 
Reshid Pasha who saw that they were escaping, tried to stop them. He turned same 
of them back to the fight but he was shot by a bullet on his leg and injured. Ibrahim 
Pasha, who was watching the events, sent the cihadiye soldier of Egypt and 
captured the monastery.1 
The Greek rebels made tactical attacks at different parts of the Ottoman Empire to 
distract the Ottoman navy which was going to help the army at Mesolongi. One of 
these attacks was occurred at Beirut. The Greek fleet was consisted of 14 ships and 
the rebels were wearing Albanian clothes. They entered Beirut from the Greek 
neighborhood and caused chaos in the city in March 22, 1826.2 
Despite all of the problems in the Ottoman army the siege of Mesolongi lasted with 
success after two months and the city was captured at April 23, 1826. 2,000 
Ottoman soldiers lost in the war. After the capture of Mesolongi, which made a 
great effect at Europe, the army turned its direction to Athens. 12,000 Ottoman 
soldiers under the command of Reshid Pasha the Commander-in-Chief and the 
governor Rumelia, reached to the city. However, the ulufes of Albanian soldiers had 
not been paid yet and the problem increased. The soldiers were tired and there was 
lack at rations. These problems postponed the capture of Athens. At that time, 
Sultan Mahmud II who abolished Janissary Corps, was busy for establishing a new 
and modern army, called Asâkir-i Mansûre-i Muhammediye (Victorious Soldiers of 
Muhammed).3 
The governor of Rumelia Reshid Pasha sent complaints to Sublime Porte because of 
the problems caused by the Albanians who did not get their payments. He said that 
he couldn’t describe the problems with words. He did not have any alternative other 
than the Albanian warriors and that made him desperate. The payments of the 
Albanians reached a total of 15.000 scrip. Pasha wanted an amount of 4.000 scrip 
immediately.4 And Reshid Pasha demanded new established Mansure soldiers for 
the campaign at Athens. Sublime Porte, evaluated the situation and decided to sent 
money for the payments. Incomes of janissaries in Create Island used as source for 
these payments. Money, first, transferred to the Imperial Mint (Darbhâne-i Âmire), 
then, to the army. At that time Reshid Pasha started to employ Turkish soldiers step 
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by step in stead of the Tosk Albanians who left the army.1 For this reason, he 
demanded soldiers from Trikala (Tırhala), Ormenion (Çirmen), Prizreni and Skopje. 
After a time, Salih Aga, the voyvoda of Pirliye, with 2,000 soldiers and Ibrahim 
Pasha of Egypt with 1,000 soldiers joined the siege at Athens. There were 30,000 
Ottoman soldiers at the siege of Athens in the mid-May. The governor of Rumelia 
increased the attacks. At last, the army captured, first, the suburbs, then the castle of 
Athens and Acropolis at June 6, 1827. 
Capturing the last castle from the rebels caused a great pleasure in Istanbul. 
However, Ottoman rulers did not continue with this pleasure too much and they 
tried to afford the needs of the soldiers in Athens. First, the accumulating payments 
of the Albanians should be paid and it had become a serious problem. Otherwise, it 
would be very hard to keep them in Athens. Also, there was a risk of plundering 
from Morea to Yanya and Trikala if they could not their payments. The state was 
compelled to strike money in order to pay the salaries at the Albanians. New 
Grandvizier Topal İzzet Mehmed Pasha prepared a detailed report for the Sultan 
and mentioned that more than 40,000 Albanian soldiers were employed during the 
Greek Revolt because of the necessity, their payments of them were completed and 
that would cause very serious problems because at the characteristics of the 
Albanians. He offered to get some money printed for solving the problem. He 
offered to mint copper coins in order to use all over the Ottoman world. Foreign 
copper coins had been used in Albania for a while and the copper coin was known. 
If the payments were done by that way, the state could continue to use 10,000 
soldiers. High rank officials in Istanbul discussed to mint copper coins and asked 
the view of Imperial Mint. It had said that this system had been used before but it 
took to much time to print this amount of money. At last, it was decided to mint not 
copper but silver coins. So, there would not be a currency problem at the other parts 
at the empire. With the order of Sultan Mahmut II, silver coins were minted and 
sent to the army.2 
The fall of Athens made a great impact at Europe. England, France and Russia 
which were in a rivalry to support the rebels increased their pressure on the 
Ottoman Empire. While the demands of these countries were refused, the 
relationships were became strained. At last, the Ottoman and Egyptian ships were 
burnt at Navarino in October 20, 1827.3 At this situation, the governor at Egypt 
wanted to withdraw his soldiers from the Morean Peninsula. Under that conditions, 
the absence of the Egyptian soldiers were tried to fulfill with the Albanian 
mercenaries, but the conditions were not suitable. 4 
The Greek rebels attacked to Chios Island during the Navarino Event (October 30, 
1827). They sieged Chios with more than 90 ships during a year. There were 1,500 
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Christian Albanian mercenaries between the rebels. Total number of the rebels was 
5,000. There were Muslim Albanians the army which was sent to the island. 
Muslim and Christian Albanians confronted once again as also happened many 
times during the revolt. Chios Island was saved with the support of navy.1 
By the year 1828, the situation turned into the favor of the Greeks in Morea. France 
sent soldiers to the peninsula in the name of three states which were supporting the 
rebels. As a result of this, a lot of cities including Athens, Tripoli, Mesolongi and 
Lepanto were captured by the rebels. Albanian soldiers started to leave their 
positions because of the lack of enough rations. For example, 5,000 Albanians left 
the Gerniş town and went to Badracık and Agrafe region because of the reason that 
they did not have a place to stay during the winter. While 2,000 Albanian soldiers, 
under the command of Arslan Bey, Omer’s nephew and the governor of Berat2, an 
Albanian leader left Mavrila, the rations were kept by the rebels. Mesolongi was 
captured by the rebels because of the problems occurred by the failure of the 
payments of the Albanians. Sultan Mahmut II got very sad in the face of this news. 
He mentioned his complaint in one of his writings and he wrote that he left the 
people who cause these situations, to God.3 
While the things were getting worse at the rebellion area, the strained relationships 
with Russia caused a great war. 1828-29 Russia-Turkish War made the things worse 
in Morea and Rumelia. The state had to fight against the Russians both in the 
Balkans and the Caucasus and the need for the Albanian mercenaries increased.4 
Before the war, Albanian leaders were invited to Istanbul and informed about the 
preparations. After the meetings with the Albanians, evaluations about using 
Albanian mercenaries were discussed and Kanicalı Hüseyin Bey was ordered to 
prepare a report about collecting soldiers for a war with Russia. Hüseyin Bey 
mentioned that it was hard to get out of any soldiers out of Yanya but it was 
possible to get 1,000 soldiers from Delvina and 1,500 soldiers from Vlora 
(Avlonya) in his report. At last, it was evaluated that the Albanians would not want 
to fight against the Russia. Sultan Mahmut II, reacted the report and ordered to 
employ 3,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry with a salary of 30 piasters per month 
temporarily from the region. The state wanted to prevent any unrest in the Rumelia 
during the Russian war and for this reason, it was employing the Albanians. Thus, 
Ibrahim Pasha, the guard of Vidin mentioned his thoughts in favor of this. A 
meeting was held in Yanya with all Albanian leaders and the terms were discussed 
with this aim. Furthermore, the Albanian leaders made a meeting between 
themselves at the house of Ibrahim Pasha in Delvina and wrote a letter to Sublime 
Porte which included their demands for fighting against the Russia. It was tried to 
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collect soldiers in Rumelia for the fighting and same of them were collected from 
Albania and Çirmen (Ormenion).1  
While the war with Russia was going on, Mansure soldiers at the strategic locations 
in Morea were taken back to Istanbul. At it was decided to put Albanian 
mercenaries with a salary of 40 piasters under the command of Arslan Bey instead 
of Mansure soldiers.2 Omer Pasha, the commander at Euboea, sent some Albanians 
under the command of Abbas and Kasım Mesguram for guarding the villages. 
However, the Albanian warriors made a deal with the Greek rebels during the fight 
and came back to Livadhia. According to this deal, Albanian leaders would provide 
the entrance of the Greeks into Livadhia. Thus, the events occurred like in Tripoli 
and the rebels entered the city at midnight easily and the city captured by the Greek 
rebels totally.3 
After the Russia- Turkish war in 1829, there were 10,000 Albanian warriors under 
the command of the governor of Rumelia and it was decided to decrease that 
number in half. Because of the autonomous Greek state was established according 
to the Treaty of Edirne in 1829.4 The state focused on another issue related with the 
Albanians. After the end of the Russian war, the soldiers, under the command of 
Mehmed Reshid Pasha, were sent on to Mustafa Bushati in Scutari. Also, there were 
some problems in Bosnia. So, influence of Bushati family in Scutari would be break 
down, like Tepedelenli Ali Pasha in Yanya and Pazvantanoglu in Vidin5. Mustafa 
Pasha operation was started in the mid-1831. Pasha had an army which consists of 
10,000 Gheg Albanians. Regular Ottoman troops and Tosk Albanians, rival 
dynasty, were sent on Mustafa Pasha. At first, Mustafa Pasha went to Scutari castle 
and the he capitulated. At this process, some of the Albanian leaders who were with 
Mustafa Pasha entered the command of Mehmed Ali Pasha, the governor of Egypt. 
Mehmed Ali Pasha sent his men to the coasts of Albania for collecting soldiers.6 
The last case of employing the Albanian mercenaries in great numbers in the 
Ottoman army was the revolt of Mehmed Ali Pasha. The state started to have 
problems with Mehmed Ali Pasha at the last stages of the Greek revolt. Mehmed 
Ali Pasha was criticized for taking back his without giving any information and 
both sides blamed each other. The reason of decision of taking away last great local 
power of the Empire, the governor of Egypt, was his expansionist activities at the 
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region. The revolt of the governor of Egypt continued for ten years1 and there were 
Albanian mercenaries both in the Ottoman army and in the Egyptian army.2 The 
Albanian soldiers, who were successful at the mountain and guerilla fights, could 
not get a success at the wars of regular armies like the war at Konya plain. The 
Albanians in the Ottoman army did not make any sense for this reason. Also, 
payment problems occurred. At the end of the war, the future of the Albanians and 
Bosnian soldiers in the army was discussed. Albanian cavalries sold their horses 
because of the lack of money after the war at Konya. Some of the Albanians 
distributed to the Anatolian cities and some of them wanted to settle in Baghdad. 
The state was happy for not paying anything to them. However, transformation of 
the other Albanians who were still in the army became a problem. For preventing 
them to plunder the towns on their way, the officials tried to transfer them to 
Saloniki without any contact with the Anatolian towns.3 
Conclusion 
Employing the Albanian mercenaries in the Ottoman army during the 18th and 19th 
centuries, definitely, was not a desired choice. Albanian warriors occurred as 
temporarily solutions for extraordinary conditions. As Sultan Mahmud II mentioned 
in his writings, the state did not expect any service and loyalty from the Albanian 
Pashas. The conditions made it compulsory to use them.4 Actually not only the 
Albanian soldiers but also the Kırcali mercenaries from Rumelia, Laz and Kurdish 
mercenaries from Anatolia and the Circassian mercenaries from Caucasia were not 
so efficient for the state. 
It should be mentioned that there were benefits for both sides for employing 
mercenaries in the army and in the local services. The state afforded their military 
needs from these mercenaries. Being a mercenary was became a way of earning life 
for the Albanians because of disadvantages of their lands. It was not a 
comprehensible situation that the Ottoman officials employed the Albanians as 
mercenaries when they needed them and then criticized them for fighting not for 
religion and the state but for the money. Those complaints did not make any sense 
while the state could not send its regular troops, like janissaries, to the battlefields. 
It would be a realistic approach to consider the Albanians, who were fighting for 
money as a way of life, not as a group which used to cause problems to the state but 
as a group resulted from those problems which were already existed.
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